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Compensation packages are an important part of a modern company’s incentive system. Most relevant
research has focused on examining the level of executive pay and the diﬀerent components of executive com-
pensation, while ignoring further discussion about a company’s pay gap. Originally, the pay-gap phenomenon
could be chieﬂy explained by tournament theory. That is, an appropriate pay gap increases employee
motivation and productivity. However, in recent years, company pay gaps have continuously widened, which
appears to be due to company executives manipulating the formulation process of compensation to increasection and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research.
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executive misuse of their power to obtain excessive pay has a series of negative economic consequences, such
as the failure of salary–incentive mechanisms and a decline in overall company performance (Bebchuk et al.,
2011).
Within the ongoing development of the Chinese economy, the compensation received by executives in
Chinese companies is increasing rapidly and company pay gaps are widening. For example, the 2010 annual
report of China International Marine Containers (Group) Ltd. (stock code 000039) indicates that the com-
pany’s largest compensation package of that year was 6.0 million RMB yuan, while its average annual
employee wage was only 65,800 yuan. In 2011, the highest executive compensation reached 9.6 million yuan,
while the average annual employee wage was only 78,600 yuan. The company’s pay gap thus increased
between 2010 and 2011, from a highest 90 times of the average employee pay, to a highest 121 times of the
average employee pay. When considering the possible negative eﬀect of the pay gap, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether the company’s governance mechanisms are able to eﬀectively reduce its pay gap and ease the
agency problem during the process of formulating compensation packages.
In China’s speciﬁc institutional setting, block shareholders are entitled to appoint personnel to listed com-
panies as directors. This is one of the major ways for block shareholders to supervise company executives.
Once the block shareholders of a company have realized that an agency problem is aﬀecting the salary-setting
process, they appoint certain personnel as company directors responsible for supervising executives’ opportu-
nistic behavior. However, the governance eﬀect of board aﬃliation may diﬀer substantially due to diﬀerences
in receiving compensation. Currently, the directors appointed by block shareholders may either receive or not
receive pay from the listed companies for which they work. Salaried directors appointed by block shareholders
are more reliant than their non-salaried counterparts on the executives of the listed company, which may
reduce director independence and thus impair the eﬃciency of their executive supervision. In contrast, non-
salaried directors appointed by the block shareholders are more independent, better able to represent the inter-
ests of block shareholders to supervise executives, and ultimately achieve a better supervision eﬀect. As a
result, only non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders can help signiﬁcantly to ease the agency
problem and reduce a company’s pay gap.
Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed ﬁrms from the 2005–2011 period, we examine the eﬀects of the
company-governance mechanism of board aﬃliation on the pay gap. Following other studies on this topic,
we interpret the pay gap between executives and employees, and the pay gap among executives as proxies
for the pay gap (Bu and Peng, 2010; Banker et al., 2011; Kato and Long, 2011). We measure board aﬃliation
using the ratio of the number of directors appointed by block shareholders to the total number of directors on
the board (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Chen et al., 2013). We also examine the diﬀerent roles of salaried and non-
salaried directors appointed by block shareholders. We measure the proportion of salaried directors as the
ratio of the number of salaried directors appointed by block shareholders to the total number of directors
on the board. We measure the proportion of non-salaried directors as the ratio of the number of non-salaried
directors appointed by block shareholders to the total number of directors on the board.
Consistent with our prediction, we ﬁnd that board aﬃliation is negatively related to the pay gap.
Furthermore, the results show that a greater presence of salaried directors appointed by block shareholders
is associated with a higher pay gap, whereas a greater presence of non-salaried directors appointed by block
shareholders is associated with a lower pay gap. These ﬁndings still hold when tested with a two-stage
regression model, so endogeneity issues are less likely to bias our empirical ﬁndings.
Next, we investigate certain factors that may aﬀect the relationship between board aﬃliation and the pay
gap. We begin by examining whether diﬀerences in product market competition aﬀect how board aﬃliation
reduces the pay gap. If a ﬁrm uses its pay gap as an incentive mechanism and the product market is highly
competitive, the salaried directors appointed by the ﬁrm’s block shareholders will increase the pay gap to
stimulate executives to work hard. However, under the same conditions, non-salaried directors appointed
by block shareholders will decrease rather than increase the pay gap. We ﬁnd that the governance eﬀect of
board aﬃliation on the pay gap is particularly prominent in industries in more competitive product markets.
Second, we investigate whether diﬀerences in ownership aﬀect the extent that board aﬃliation reduces the
pay gap. The results indicate no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the eﬀects of salaried and non-salaried directors
appointed by block shareholders on the pay gap between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. This
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holders in both state-owned ﬁrms and non-state-owned ﬁrms.
Third, as controlling and non-controlling shareholders may have diﬀerent motivations for appointing direc-
tors, we separately examine the eﬀects on the pay gap of directors appointed by controlling shareholders and
those appointed by non-controlling shareholders. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the governance function
of board aﬃliation between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders.
Finally, we determine whether diﬀerent administrative duties aﬀect the extent to which board aﬃliation
reduces the pay gap. We distinguish between the administrative duties of the highest-paid executives and inves-
tigate the relationship between board aﬃliation and the pay gap in each case. The results suggest that diﬀer-
ences in administrative duties do not aﬀect the governance function of board aﬃliation.
This paper contributes to the literatures in the following ways. First, it oﬀers supportive evidence on com-
pany pay gaps. For example, Bebchuk et al. (2011) ﬁnd that executive pay gaps are associated with lower ﬁrm
value and lower future cash ﬂows. Our results suggest that the presence of non-salaried directors appointed by
block shareholders decreases the pay gap. Second, our study provides implications for research on board aﬃl-
iation. For a sample of Japanese companies, Colpan and Yoshikawa (2012) investigate the governance eﬀect
of directors appointed by block shareholders on the agency problem. Our paper adds to the literature by using
a sample of Chinese listed ﬁrms and explores the diﬀerent roles of salaried and non-salaried directors
appointed by block shareholders.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature. In Section 3, we
develop hypotheses based on an analysis of the institutional background. In Section 4, we describe our sample,
variables and research design. In Section 5, we present our empirical results and analysis. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2. Literature review
Recently, the rapid growth in executive compensation has caused company pay gaps to bigger. Bebchuk
and Grinstein (2005) examine the changes in executive compensation in U.S. listed companies from 1993 to
2003, and ﬁnd that the growth in executive compensation during this period was much higher than company
growth in terms of size and performance, with the growth in CEO compensation exceeding the total growth in
the compensation of executives at the second, third, fourth and ﬁfth levels. Speciﬁcally, the proportion of CEO
compensation in the total compensation received by top-ﬁve executives increased from 39% in 1993 to 43% in
2003. Li (2011) examines 1993–2006 data on executive compensation in U.S. capital-market listed companies
and ﬁnds that the diﬀerence between CEO compensation and No. 2 executive compensation increased from
40% in 1993 to 60% in 2006. Using a sample of Canadian listed companies during 2000–2005, Sapp (2008)
reports that within this six-year period, the pay gap between CEOs and other executives doubled. Investigating
Chinese listed companies in 1999 to 2000, Lin et al. (2003) report that the compensation received by CEOs was
1.43 times greater than the compensation provided to other executives. The pay gap has also expanded after
2001, with CEO compensation 2.328 times that of other executives’ compensation in 2009.
In addition to the widening pay gap among executives, the pay gap between executives and employees is
also expanding. Hall and Murph (2003), using S&P500 ﬁrms as their sample, report that executive compen-
sation increased from 30 times that of other employees in 1970 to 1990 times in 2002. Studies on Chinese listed
companies describe a similar phenomenon. The proportion of companies with the pay gap within ﬁve times is
declining, while the companies with the pay gap more than eight times increased from 10% to 24.53% (Zhang,
2008). In a recent study, Liu and Sun (2010) ﬁnd that the absolute pay gap between executives and employees
in state-owned enterprises reached 290,000 yuan in 2007, which is almost double the pay gap in 2004. Thus,
the expansion of company pay gaps now seems to be a common worldwide phenomenon.
“Tournament theory” has been used to explain the eﬀects of the pay gap. This theory explains that increas-
ing the pay gap can help enhance executives’ enthusiasm for work, reduce supervising costs and ultimately
improve corporate performance. When a company designs a compensation package based on tournament the-
ory, the level of executive compensation depends on relative performance rather than absolute performance.
As a result, the pay gap gradually increases as promotions occur (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986). This
kind salary structure can have a positive and incentivizing eﬀect on executives, prompting them to exert more
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vising executives has become a more diﬃcult and costly process, companies’ need for an internal pay gap has
increased. An appropriate pay gap can help to reduce opportunistic behavior among competitive executives,
therefore reduce supervising costs. Research in this area has also addressed the necessity of a company pay gap
from the perspective of internal CEO candidate structure and CEO succession risk (Schwarz and Severinov,
2010). With these criteria in mind, an internal pay gap is one of the most important means for a company to
motivate employees and attract the talents, making it a form of valuable expenditure that shareholders are
willing to accept. It can thus have a positive eﬀect on company performance.
However, the phenomenon of the continuously widening pay gap has in recent years led people to reﬂect
and sometimes cast doubt on the positive, incentivizing eﬀect of tournament theory. “Executive-power theory”
explains that widening pay gaps lead to excessive pay gaps as a result of executive misuse of their power to
increase their own level of pay and obtain private beneﬁts (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Fundamental to this
theory is the assumption that company executives, especially CEOs, are eager to pursue and secure greater
power. With a suﬃcient level of power, they can control the board of directors and thereby inﬂuence the
design of their companies’ compensation contracts to increase their own compensation without the constraints
and limitations imposed by shareholders and regulators. This leads to the expansion of the company pay gap
(Adams et al., 2005). According to executive-power theory, therefore, excessive pay gaps are likely to result
from the misuse of executive power to inﬂuence the design of compensation contracts.
The ﬁndings of recent empirical studies support the executive-power theory. Bebchuk et al. (2011) analyze
12,011 U.S. companies from the 1993–2004 period and report that the larger the pay gaps between the top-ﬁve
executives, the lower the value of the company. Chen et al. (2011b) examine U.S. listed companies between
1993 and 2007, and argue that a large pay gap between executives signiﬁes to those external to the company
that the company has a serious agency problem. This leads to a signiﬁcant increase in the company’s cost of
capital. The authors also observe that the agency problem is more serious in companies with greater cash ﬂows
and those that have experienced changes in executive structure. In other words, the positive relationship
between the pay gap and agency problems is much stronger under these conditions.
3. Institutional background and research hypothesis
3.1. Institutional background
Until the end of 1992, although the Chinese government encouraged enterprises to widen their pay gaps to
some extent when designing employee-compensation plans, a clear restriction was still in place: executive com-
pensation was not permitted to exceed three times that of the average employee. However, egalitarian com-
pensation designs tend to reduce employee enthusiasm, thus impairing overall company productivity. To
accelerate the development of China’s market economy, the government advocated from 1993 to 2003 that
companies “give priority to eﬃciency with due consideration to fairness.” Relevant laws and regulations were
introduced to facilitate the expansion of pay gaps “among all kinds of personnel” to increase employee enthu-
siasm and maximize social wealth. Encouraged by the government, companies’ internal pay gaps expanded
rapidly. The data disclosed by the SASAC (the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commis-
sion) show that executive compensation in China’s central government controlled enterprises was 12 times
than average employee salary in 2002, reached 13.6 times in 2003, and continues to expand.
The negative eﬀects of these excessive pay gaps aroused great concerns from China’s government, which
accordingly made several adjustments to its policy during major conferences. In 2009, during the ﬁrst session
of the 11th National People’s Congress, the government expressed the intention to “progressively reverse” the
widening trend of the pay gap. In 2012, during the second session of the 11th National People’s Congress, it
promised to “speedily reverse” the trend. Analysis of the rhetoric of the Congress suggests that the govern-
ment became less tolerant of the excessive pay gap and thus increased its eﬀorts to reduce the excessive pay
gap. From expressing “encouragement” of the widening gap, it proposed “gradually reversing” this trend,
and eventually described a “resolute” and “speedy” reversal. This indicates that the negative eﬀects of an
excessive pay gap on the development of China’s economy now urgently require a solution from the Chinese
government.
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Once the block shareholders in a company realize that the company’s excessive pay gap is due to the agency
cost of executive power, they are likely to introduce governance mechanisms to mitigate these agency prob-
lems. Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that a company’s board of directors plays an important role in super-
vising executives and reducing the agency costs. It is common for block shareholders to directly appoint
personnel to a company’s board of directors in a supervisory capacity, in order to ensure that executives eﬃ-
ciently represent the interests of the company’s shareholders (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005). The contribution of a
shareholder-appointed director signiﬁcantly improves company governance. For example, Colpan and
Yoshikawa (2012) examine Japanese listed companies and ﬁnd that directors appointed by block shareholders
can reduce companies’ agency problems by enhancing the sensitivity of the relationship between compensation
and performance. In supervising executives, the directors represent shareholders’ interests and deploy eﬀective
governance mechanisms to control the pay gap caused by the misuse of executive power, thereby reducing the
opportunistic behavior of executives in pursuit of excessive compensation, and ultimately reducing the com-
pany’s overall pay gap. We thus propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. The ratio of directors appointed by shareholders to the total number of directors is negatively
related to the company pay gap.
Generally, company directors have two main functions: supervising other employees and providing strate-
gic recommendations (Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010). However, high performance in one area may compro-
mise the success of the other. Masulis et al. (2012) report that based on their sample, foreign independent
directors hired by U.S. listed companies successfully provide strategic advice, such as helping executives to
implement cross-border mergers and acquisitions strategies, and achieve high returns. However, the authors
also observe that such directors fail to fulﬁll their supervisory role. They are frequently absent from board
meetings and CEO compensation tends to be too high. Moreover, when company performance is poor, for-
eign independent directors often fail to dismiss incompetent CEOs in a timely fashion. Investigating directors’
supervisory role, Faleye et al. (2011) report that in companies with stronger director supervision, there is a
greater correlation between change in CEO and performance. In addition, the CEOs of these companies
receive less excessive compensation and perform less earnings management. However, the strategic perfor-
mance of the directors of these companies is comparatively weak.
Two kinds of directors may be appointed by block shareholders to China’s listed companies: salaried and
non-salaried directors. Salaried directors appointed by block shareholders often provide executives with stra-
tegic management advice and either participate in or are responsible for company management. Such directors
are independent, but are also more susceptible to the inﬂuence of other executives, making it diﬃcult for them
to eﬀectively perform the duties required of them by the company shareholders. In contrast, non-salaried
directors appointed by shareholders who receive compensation directly from the shareholders and work to
further their interests through participation in company governance and the supervision of executive behavior.
Such directors are less susceptible to the inﬂuence of the listed company’s other executives and thus act more
independently. In short, when directors appointed by shareholders receive compensation from the companies,
they are more susceptible to the constraints of executive power when participating in company governance and
making decisions. As they are also more likely to share the interests and priorities of the company executives,
they may sacriﬁce shareholders’ interests to gain more private income, which increases the company’s pay gap.
In contrast, when directors appointed by shareholders receive compensation from the shareholders, they do
not have a direct economic connection with executives and are more likely to share and pursue shareholders’
interests by strengthening their supervision of executive behavior, and ultimately reducing the company’s pay
gap. This suggests the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2. The ratio of salaried directors appointed by shareholders to the total number of directors is
positively related to the company pay gap.
Hypothesis 3. The ratio of non-salaried directors appointed by shareholders to the total number of directors is
negatively related to the company pay gap.
86 S. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 81–1004. Research design
4.1. Sample
The 2005 revision of the “Annual Reporting Standards” required listed companies for the ﬁrst time to dis-
close executive compensation on an individual basis. To ensure the integrity of the sample and to eﬀectively
investigate the relationship between shareholder-appointed directors and the pay gap, we examine listed com-
panies in the 2005–2011 period, using all types of listed companies in our initial study sample except ﬁnancial
and insurance companies. After excluding incomplete observations, our sample comprises 9186 observations.
Ownership data of listed companies was hand-collected from company annual reports and compensation and
ﬁnancial data were obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. As
the sample is composed of diﬀerent companies in diﬀerent years, giving mixed (pooled) data, the annual obser-
vations of a given company do not meet the requirement of independence, which could lead us to overvalue
the statistical signiﬁcance of the regression results. To correct this statistical problem, we use a “clustering”
method to adjust the standard error of the estimated coeﬃcient for each company (Petersen, 2009).
4.2. Variables
4.2.1. Company pay gap
In line with existing research, we use the relative pay gap between executives and employees, and the rel-
ative compensation among executives to measure the company pay gap (Bu and Peng, 2010; Banker et al.,
2011; Kato and Long, 2011).
We use the following equation to calculate the relative pay gap between executives and employees.LEGap ¼ Ln MaxMPay CashPayþ SalPayCh TotMPay
EmpNum  TotMNum
 
ð1ÞWe use the following equation to calculate the relative pay gap between the highest paid top executive and
the other top executives.LMGap ¼ Ln MaxMPay TotMPayMaxMPay
TotMNum  1
 
ð2ÞIn the equations above, LEGap represents the natural logarithm of the relative pay gap between executives
and employees, LMGay represents the natural logarithm of the relative pay gap between the highest paid top
executive and the other top executives, and MaxMPay represents a company’s highest executive compensa-
tion. CashPay represents the cash paid by the company to its employees, SalPayCh represents the change
in the employee compensation paid by the company, TotMpay represents the total executive compensation
awarded by the company, EmpNum represents the total number of employees and TotMNum represents
the total number of executives.
4.2.2. Directors appointed by shareholders
Our measure of directors appointed by block shareholders is represented by the ratio of the number of
directors appointed by block shareholders to the total number of directors on the board (Yeh and
Woidtke, 2005; Chen et al., 2013). In Chinese listed companies, directors appointed by shareholders may
receive compensation directly from the company for which they work, or from a source external to the com-
pany. Therefore, we deﬁne the following three variables: (1) directors appointed by shareholders (TPR), which
is represented by the ratio of the number of directors appointed by shareholders to the total number of direc-
tors on the board; (2) salaried directors appointed by shareholders (PR), which is represented by the ratio of
the number of shareholder-appointed directors who receive compensation directly from the listed company for
which they work to the total number of directors on the board; and (3) non-salaried directors appointed by
shareholders (NPR), which is represented by the ratio of the number of shareholder-appointed directors who
do not receive compensation directly from their companies to the total number of directors on the board.
S. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 81–100 874.2.3. Control variables
Following recommendations made in the literature, we include the following control variables (Fang, 2009;
Xin and Tan, 2009; Chen et al., 2011a): (1) Chairman and CEO duality (CEOD), which is equal to 1 if the
chairman also holds the position of CEO, otherwise 0; (2) the size of the board of directors (Bsize), which
is equal to the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board; (3) independent directors (IndepR),
which is equal to the ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number of directors on the
board; (4) compensation committee (Commit), a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has a compensa-
tion committee in the year under study, otherwise 0; (5) company performance (ROA), which is equal to the
ratio of the company’s net proﬁt to its year-end total assets; (6) company size (Size), which is equal to the nat-
ural logarithm of the company’s total assets in that year; (7) the company’s leverage (Lev), which is equal to
the ratio of the company’s year-end long-term liabilities to its year-end total assets; (8) company risk (Risk),
which is equal to the standard deviation of the monthly returns of the company’s stock in that year; (9) com-
pany growth potential (Q), which is equal to the ratio of the sum of the company’s tradable stock-market
value, non-tradable stock-market value and liabilities to its last-year-end total assets; (10) cross-listing (Exch),
which is equal to 1 if that year the company was also listed on other overseas exchanges, otherwise 0; and (11)
special treatment (ST), which is equal to 1 if that year the company was under ST or ST, otherwise 0.4.3. Research model
First, we use the following regression model to examine the relationship between the presence of share-
holder-appointed directors and the pay gap.Table
Variab
Variab
Pay-ga
EGap
LEGa
MGap
LMGa
Shareh
TPR
PR
NPR
Board
CEOD
Bsize
IndepR
Comm
Compa
ROA
Size
Lev
Risk
Q
Exch
STGap ¼ aþ b1TPRþ b2CEODþ b3Bsizeþ b4IndepRþ b5Commit þ b6ROAþ b7Sizeþ b8Lev
þ b9Riskþ b10Qþ b11Exchþ b12STþYear fixed effectþ Industry fixed effectþ e ð3Þ1
le deﬁnitions.
les Deﬁnitions
p variables
Ratio of the highest executive compensation to average employee (excluding executives’) compensation
p Natural logarithm of EGap.
Ratio of the highest executive compensation to the average compensation of other executives
p Natural logarithm of MGap
older-appointed director variables
Ratio of the number of directors appointed by block shareholders to the total number of directors on the board.
Ratio of the number of directors appointed by block shareholders who receive salaries from the listed company to the total
number of directors on the board.
Ratio of the number of directors appointed by block shareholders who do not receive salaries from the listed company to
the total number of directors on the board
of director variables
Equal to 1 if the chairman also holds the position of CEO, otherwise 0
Natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board
Ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number of directors on the board
it Equal to 1 if that year the company has a compensation committee, otherwise 0
ny variables
Ratio of the company’s net proﬁt to its year-end total assets
Natural logarithm of the company’s year-end total assets
Ratio of the company’s year-end long-term liabilities to its year-end total assets
Standard deviation of the monthly returns on the company’s stock in that year
Ratio of the sum of the company’s tradable stock-market value, non-tradable stock-book value and liabilities to its last-
year-end total assets
Equal to 1 if that year the company was also listed on other overseas exchanges, otherwise 0
Equal to 1 if that year the company was under ST or ST, otherwise 0
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and non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders.Gap ¼ aþ b1PRþ b2NPRþ b3CEODþ b4Bsizeþ b5IndepRþ b6Commit þ b7ROA
þ b8Sizeþ b9Levþ b10Riskþ b11Qþ b12Exchþ b13STþYear fixed effect
þ Industry fixed effectþ e ð4ÞThe deﬁnitions of the variables used in the model are listed in Table 1. “Gap” signiﬁes either LEGap or
LMGap, as appropriate.
5. Empirical results and analysis
5.1. Descriptive statistics
To mitigate the eﬀect of extreme values on our empirical analysis, we winsorize the top and bottom 1% of
values for all continuous variables. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics. In Panel A, we provide descrip-
tive statistics for sub-groups of ﬁrms with and without directors appointed by shareholders. In ﬁrms with
directors appointed by block shareholders, the mean (median) of the pay gap between executives and employ-
ees is 2.003 (1.978). In ﬁrms without directors appointed by block shareholders, the mean (median) of the pay
gap between executives and employees is 1.916 (1.875). The diﬀerences between the mean and median for the
two groups are signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t = 3.575, z = 3.912). There are also signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
mean and median of executives’ pay gap between ﬁrms with and without directors appointed by shareholders.
In Panel B, we divide ﬁrms with shareholder-appointed directors into ﬁrms with company-salaried and non-
company-salaried directors to analyze diﬀerences in the company pay gap. In ﬁrms with salaried shareholder-
appointed directors, the mean (median) of the pay gap between executives and employees is 2.085 (2.065) and
the mean (median) of the pay gap between executives is 0.998 (0.956). In ﬁrms with non-salaried shareholder-
appointed directors, the mean (median) of the pay gap between executives and employees is 1.810 (1.761) and
the mean (median) of the pay gap between executives is 0.872 (0.805). Furthermore, the pay gap in ﬁrms with
salaried directors appointed by shareholders is signiﬁcantly larger than that in ﬁrms with non-salaried direc-
tors (t = 15.731, z = 15.430; t = 15.768, z = 16.299). This is probably due to the tendency for salaried directors
appointed by block shareholders to increase the pay gap and for non-salaried directors appointed by block
shareholders to decrease the pay gap.
In Panel C, we report the descriptive statistics for this paper’s main variables. The average pay gap between
executives and employees is 9.385, with the highest at 53.735. The average pay gap between executives is 2.706
and the highest is 8.290. The mean of the ratio of directors appointed by shareholders is 0.296. As the mean of
the ratio of salaried shareholder-appointed directors is 0.103 and the mean of the ratio of non-salaried share-
holder-appointed directors is 0.192, the ratio of non-salaried directors appointed by shareholders is nearly
twice that of salaried directors. These ﬁndings indicate that the shareholders of the listed companies under
study appoint more non-salaried than salaried directors. Regarding board of director variables, it is uncom-
mon for CEOs to also be chairmen of the board, and there is little variation in the size of the boards of direc-
tors. Generally, independent directors comprise nearly one third of the board of directors and most of the
companies have a compensation committee in the year under study. Of the sample companies, 3.2% are
cross-listed and 9.3% are classiﬁed as ST in the year under study.
5.2. Correlation analysis
In Table 3, we provide the results of the correlation analysis of the main variables. The correlation coeﬃ-
cients of TPR and LEGap or LMGap are 0.046 and 0.043, respectively, and are signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
The correlation coeﬃcients of PR and LEGap or LMGap are 0.140 and 0.141, respectively, and are signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. The correlation coeﬃcients of NPR and LEGap or LMGap are 0.158 and 0.155, respec-
tively, and are negatively signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The results show that there is a negative correlation
between the ratio of directors appointed by shareholders and the pay gap. More speciﬁcally, the ratio of
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variables Firms with directors appointed by block shareholders N = 8053 Firms without directors appointed by block shareholders N = 1133 t-Statistic z-Statistic
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for pay gap in ﬁrms with and without directors appointed by shareholders
LEGap 2.003 1.978 0.777 1.916 1.875 0.774 3.575*** 3.912***
LMGap 0.942 0.890 0.357 0.921 0.860 0.361 1.826* 2.408**
Variables Firms with salaried directors appointed by block shareholders
N = 3078
Firms with non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders
N = 4975
t-Statistic z-Statistic
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for pay gap in ﬁrms with salaried and non-salaried directors appointed by shareholders
LEGap 2.085 2.065 0.785 1.810 1.761 0.748 15.731*** 15.430***
LMGap 0.998 0.956 0.370 0.872 0.805 0.347 15.768*** 16.299***
Variables N Mean SD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for the main variables
Pay gap variables
EGap 9186 9.385 8.724 1.268 4.036 6.600 11.602 53.735
LEGap 9186 1.926 0.775 0.237 1.395 1.887 2.451 3.984
MGap 9186 2.706 1.183 1.364 1.937 2.371 3.089 8.290
LMGap 9186 0.923 0.361 0.310 0.661 0.864 1.128 2.115
Shareholder-appointed director variables
TPR 9186 0.296 0.184 0.000 0.143 0.300 0.444 0.667
PR 9186 0.103 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.556
NPR 9186 0.192 0.176 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.333 0.600
Board of director variables
CEOD 9186 0.162 0.368 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Bsize 9186 2.204 0.202 1.609 2.197 2.197 2.303 2.708
IndepR 9186 0.361 0.049 0.250 0.333 0.333 0.375 0.556
Commit 9186 0.784 0.411 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Company variables
ROA 9186 0.039 0.072 0.265 0.011 0.038 0.072 0.233
Size 9186 21.604 1.182 19.140 20.783 21.457 22.251 25.303
Lev 9186 0.074 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.110 0.471
Risk 9186 0.143 0.058 0.057 0.101 0.131 0.174 0.353
Q 9186 1.668 1.472 2.795 0.883 1.345 2.096 9.169
Exch 9186 0.032 0.175 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
ST 9186 0.093 0.290 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
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Table 3
Correlation analysis.
LEGap LMGap TPR PR NPR CEOD Bsize IndepR Commit ROA Size Lev Risk Q Exch
LMGap 0.505*
TPR 0.046* 0.043*
PR 0.140* 0.141* 0.433*
NPR 0.158* 0.155* 0.699* 0.339*
CEOD 0.059* 0.087* 0.174* 0.006 0.187*
Bsize 0.051* 0.017 0.186* 0.015 0.184* 0.141*
IndepR 0.029* 0.069* 0.186* 0.022* 0.175* 0.079* 0.327*
Commit 0.089* 0.088* 0.054* 0.026* 0.076* 0.040* 0.039* 0.096*
ROA 0.217* 0.070* 0.029* 0.058* 0.015 0.013 0.053* 0.013 0.059*
Size 0.182* 0.048* 0.152* 0.059* 0.111* 0.133* 0.265* 0.052* 0.119* 0.184*
Lev 0.003 0.023* 0.107* 0.0429* 0.079* 0.116* 0.136* 0.011 0.033* 0.074* 0.423*
Risk 0.062* 0.006 0.013 0.009 0.021* 0.035* 0.022* 0.009 0.017 0.117* 0.110* 0.014
Q 0.044* 0.064* 0.079* 0.018 0.068* 0.087* 0.072* 0.016 0.035* 0.197* 0.248* 0.276* 0.086*
Exch 0.067* 0.003 0.038* 0.067* 0.016 0.042* 0.121* 0.060* 0.036* 0.020 0.332* 0.124* 0.048* 0.053*
ST 0.109* 0.015 0.008 0.039* 0.024* 0.023* 0.084* 0.005 0.009 0.247* 0.215* 0.022* 0.118* 0.077* 0.026*
* Signiﬁcant at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
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S. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 81–100 91salaried directors appointed by shareholders is positively correlated with the pay gap, while the ratio of non-
salaried directors appointed by shareholders is negatively correlated with the pay gap. This indicates that due
to diﬀerences in their means of receiving compensation, directors appointed by shareholders have diﬀerent
eﬀects on the pay gap. The pay gap increases with the increased presence of shareholder-appointed directors
who receive compensation from a listed company, and decreases with the increased presence of shareholder-
appointed directors who do not receive compensation from the company. Company risk (Risk), company
growth potential (Q) and special treatment (ST) are negatively correlated with LEGap and are signiﬁcant
at the 5% level, whereas the other variables are positively correlated with LEGap. The size of the board of
directors (Bsize) and the company’s size (Size), leverage (Lev), risk (Risk) and growth potential (Q) are neg-
atively correlated with LMGap, whereas the other variables are positively correlated with LMGap.
5.3. Regression analysis
Table 4 shows the regression results for the eﬀects on the pay gap of directors appointed by block share-
holders, salaried directors appointed by block shareholders and non-salaried directors appointed by block
shareholders. We ﬁrst examine the eﬀects on the pay gap of the ratio of directors appointed by block share-
holders and provide the corresponding regression results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. When the depen-
dent variable is LEGap, TPR’s regression coeﬃcient is 0.197 and is signiﬁcant at the 5% level (t = 2.53).
This shows that when the ratio of directors appointed by block shareholders increases by one standard devi-
ation, the pay gap between executives and employees will signiﬁcantly decrease, by 3.63%. When the depen-
dent variable is LMGap, TPR’s regression coeﬃcient is 0.006, so the pay gap between executives and
employees will decrease by 1.10% with a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of directors appointed
by shareholders. However, this coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant (t = 0.15). Overall, these regression results show
that the higher the ratio of directors appointed by block shareholders, the smaller the pay gap. This means that
directors appointed by shareholders are to some extent able to represent shareholders’ interests by eﬀectively
supervising executives, reducing their opportunistic behavior in pursuit of excessive pay, and thereby decreas-
ing the company’s pay gap. The regression results described above thus support our ﬁrst hypothesis.
The directors appointed by block shareholders can be further divided into salaried directors appointed by
block shareholders and non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders, according to whether they
receive compensation from the listed companies for which they work. We compare the eﬀects on the pay
gap of salaried and non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders and report the corresponding
regression results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4. When the dependent variable is LEGap, the regression
coeﬃcient of the variable PR is 0.403, and that of the variable NPR is 0.532, both signiﬁcant (t = 4.01;
t = 6.10) at the 1% level. These results show that when the ratio of salaried directors appointed by block
shareholders increases by one standard deviation, the pay gap between executives and employees increases
by 5.56%. When the ratio of non-salaried directors appointed by shareholders increases by one standard devi-
ation, the pay gap between executives and employees decreases by 9.36%. When the dependent variable is
LMGap, PR’s regression coeﬃcient is 0.282 and NPR’s regression coeﬃcient is 0.165, and both are signif-
icant at the 1% level (t = 5.51; t = 4.07), which is consistent with the results for LEGap given in column (3).
The results show that the higher the ratio of salaried directors appointed by block shareholders, the larger the
pay gap, and the higher the ratio of non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders, the smaller the
pay gap. This suggests that only non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders are able to provide
eﬀective supervision and thereby a better governance eﬀect, namely decreasing the company pay gap. When
the directors appointed to a listed company by its block shareholders receive compensation from the listed
company itself, they are more likely to rely on the company’s executives than to act independently on behalf
of shareholders. As a result, they increase the company’s pay gap further. In contrast, when the directors
appointed by shareholders do not receive compensation from the listed company, they are more independent
and are able to represent shareholders’ interests by supervising executives and reducing their opportunistic
eﬀorts to obtain excessive pay. As a result, non-salaried directors reduce both agency costs and the company
pay gap. The regression results provide supportive empirical evidence for our second and third hypotheses.
To eliminate the potential adverse eﬀects of endogeneity, we also use the instrumental-variable regression
method. In line with recent studies (Hoechle et al., 2012; Wintoki et al., 2012; Jayaraman and Milbourn, 2012),
Table 4
Regression results for the eﬀects on pay gap of directors appointed by block shareholders.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: LEGap Dependent variable: LMGap Dependent variable: LEGap Dependent variable: LMGap
TPR 0.197** 0.006
(2.53) (0.15)
PR 0.403*** 0.282***
(4.01) (5.51)
NPR 0.532*** 0.165***
(6.10) (4.07)
CEOD 0.114*** 0.064*** 0.089** 0.052***
(3.14) (3.45) (2.47) (2.82)
Bsize 0.131 0.079** 0.161** 0.093**
(1.58) (2.10) (1.98) (2.51)
IndepR 0.061 0.470*** 0.018 0.432***
(0.21) (3.23) (0.06) (2.97)
Commit 0.067** 0.054*** 0.064** 0.052***
(2.10) (3.62) (2.03) (3.59)
ROA 1.763*** 0.363*** 1.704*** 0.334***
(10.12) (4.36) (9.88) (4.07)
Size 0.112*** 0.024*** 0.117*** 0.022***
(6.15) (2.92) (6.60) (2.67)
Lev 0.221 0.128* 0.184 0.110
(1.41) (1.72) (1.19) (1.51)
Risk 0.337* 0.071 0.267 0.038
(1.68) (0.74) (1.34) (0.40)
Q 0.017** 0.007 0.018** 0.007*
(2.07) (1.57) (2.30) (1.79)
Exch 0.105 0.047 0.052 0.021
(1.00) (0.94) (0.50) (0.44)
ST 0.089** 0.023 0.070 0.033
(2.01) (1.08) (1.59) (1.57)
Intercept 0.905** 1.009*** 1.025** 0.952***
(2.17) (5.31) (2.53) (5.04)
Industry Control Control Control Control
Year Control Control Control Control
N 9186 9186 9186 9186
Adj. Rsq 0.124 0.040 0.145 0.063
N_clust 1985 1985 1985 1985
F 15.176 6.426 18.289 9.251
Note: All coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain robust standard errors. Adjusted t-
Statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels (two-tailed test).
92 S. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 81–100our instrumental variables for the two-stage least-squares regression are the industry’s mean and the previous
year’s value of the ratio of directors appointed by shareholders (ratio of salaried directors appointed by block
shareholders and ratio of non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders). Following the recommen-
dations by Larcker and Rusticus (2010), we also conduct a validation test on the correlation conditions and
exogenous conditions of the two instrumental variables.
In Table 5, we report the results of the instrumental-variable correlation test, the exogenous test and the
instrumental-variable regression. When the dependent variable is LEGap, the instrumental-variable correla-
tion test gives F-values for PR and NPR that are both larger than 10 (F = 963.62 > 10; F = 1531.82 > 10),
which means that our selected instrumental variables fulﬁll the correlation conditions. The results of the
instrumental-variable exogenous test do not have statistical signiﬁcance (J = 3.170, P = 0.2049), so we cannot
reject the null hypothesis. That is, our results pass the instrumental-variable exogenous test. As they fulﬁll
both the correlation conditions and the exogenous conditions, our instrumental variables can be considered
Table 5
Regression results using instrumental variables.
Dependent variable: LEGap Dependent variable: LMGap
PR 0.572*** 0.385***
(3.88) (5.08)
NPR 0.667*** 0.174***
(5.29) (2.95)
CEOD 0.079* 0.061***
(1.83) (2.75)
Bsize 0.126 0.085**
(1.40) (2.08)
IndepR 0.184 0.501***
(0.59) (3.17)
Commit 0.067* 0.043**
(1.82) (2.54)
ROA 1.715*** 0.405***
(9.14) (4.56)
Size 0.128*** 0.022**
(6.82) (2.41)
Lev 0.098 0.085
(0.60) (1.09)
Risk 0.178 0.035
(0.83) (0.34)
Q 0.020** 0.007
(2.52) (1.60)
Exch 0.022 0.022
(0.20) (0.42)
ST 0.062 0.039*
(1.34) (1.73)
Intercept 0.848* 1.039***
(1.91) (4.88)
Industry Control Control
Year Control Control
N 7266 7266
Adj. R-sq 0.143 0.069
N_clust 1597 1597
F 14.784 7.184
Weak instrumental-variable test PR: F = 963.62 PR: F = 963.62
NPR: F = 1531.82 NPR: F = 1531.82
Overidentifying-restrictions J-test and P-value J = 3.170, P = 0.2049 J = 5.236, P = 0.0729
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain
robust standard errors. Adjusted z-Statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% (two-tailed test).
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% (two-tailed test).
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are both signiﬁcant at the 1% level (z = 3.88, z = 5.29). When the dependent variable is LMGap, the results
are almost the same. Therefore, after addressing the endogeneity problem, the results of the study still hold. In
short, salaried directors appointed by block shareholders signiﬁcantly increase their companies’ pay gap, while
non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders signiﬁcantly decrease their companies’ pay gap.5.4. Additional tests
5.4.1. The eﬀects of industry competition
Table 6 shows the regression results for the eﬀects of diﬀerent levels of industry competition on the gover-
nance eﬀects of directors appointed by block shareholders, with the total number of companies in the industry
Table 6
Regression results of the eﬀects of product market competition.
Dependent variable: LEGap Dependent variable: LMGap
(1) High competition (2) Low competition (3) High competition (4) Low competition
PR 0.414*** 0.405*** 0.199*** 0.368***
(2.85) (3.05) (2.69) (5.65)
NPR 0.664*** 0.432*** 0.255*** 0.088
(5.40) (3.68) (4.54) (1.59)
CEOD 0.050 0.115** 0.030 0.070***
(1.04) (2.23) (1.32) (2.62)
Bsize 0.051 0.329*** 0.078 0.109**
(0.41) (3.17) (1.46) (2.21)
IndepR 0.085 0.006 0.574** 0.329*
(0.18) (0.02) (2.34) (1.94)
Commit 0.104** 0.025 0.062*** 0.042**
(2.31) (0.60) (2.97) (2.17)
ROA 2.080*** 1.349*** 0.575*** 0.110
(8.52) (6.01) (4.96) (1.03)
Size 0.102*** 0.131*** 0.025** 0.020*
(3.91) (5.62) (2.16) (1.78)
Lev 0.265 0.080 0.137 0.061
(1.08) (0.42) (1.19) (0.67)
Risk 0.427 0.026 0.170 0.118
(1.52) (0.09) (1.28) (0.88)
Q 0.014 0.021** 0.005 0.009*
(1.09) (2.22) (0.76) (1.78)
Exch 0.027 0.063 0.027 0.060
(0.18) (0.48) (0.42) (0.93)
ST 0.070 0.064 0.072** 0.005
(1.11) (1.10) (2.36) (0.18)
Intercept 0.185 1.747*** 1.013*** 0.875***
(0.32) (3.32) (3.84) (3.43)
Industry Control Control Control Control
Year Control Control Control Control
N 4240 4946 4240 4946
Adj. R-sq 0.133 0.162 0.065 0.065
N_clust 1045 1143 1045 1143
F 12.158 14.018 7.794 7.099
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain robust standard errors.
Adjusted t-Statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% (two-tailed test).
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% (two-tailed test).
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the sample into a group of ﬁrms facing high competition and a group of ﬁrms facing low competition, accord-
ing to the magnitude of each company’s industry. When the dependent variable is LEGap, PR’s regression
coeﬃcients in the high-competition group and the low-competition group are 0.414 and 0.405 respectively,
and both are signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level (t = 2.85, t = 3.05). The diﬀerences in the regression coeﬃ-
cients for these two groups do not pass the signiﬁcance test (p-value = 0.94), so diﬀerent levels of industry
competition can be considered to have no signiﬁcant eﬀects on the relationship between the governance of sal-
aried shareholder-appointed directors and the pay gap. NPR’s regression coeﬃcients in the high-competition
and low-competition group are 0.664 and 0.432, respectively, and are signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t = 5.40,
t = 3.68). It is clear that when an industry is highly competitive, the role of non-salaried shareholder-
appointed directors in decreasing the pay gap is much larger, with this diﬀerence statistically signiﬁcant
(p-value = 0.09). When the dependent variable is LMgap, the results are consistent. In highly competitive
industries, the governance eﬀects of non-salaried shareholder-appointed directors on the pay gap are more
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nies is due to agency problems within the companies, rather than the result of incentivizing pay. This is at odds
with our competitive hypothesis: that the increased pay gap is due to the use of incentives. It also shows that
the presence of non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders and external industry competition play
complementary roles in the process by which eﬀective governance decreases the pay gap.5.4.2. The inﬂuence of state ownership
We also examine diﬀerences in the governance eﬀects of directors appointed by block shareholders between
state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. In Table 7, we report the regression results for the
eﬀects of salaried and non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders on the pay gap in state-owned
enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. As shown in the table, when the dependent variable is LEGap,
PR’s regression coeﬃcients are 0.482 and 0.256, signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t = 3.26) and the 5% level (t = 2.00)Table 7
Regression results for the eﬀects of state ownership on the governance of directors appointed by shareholders.
Dependent variable: LEGap Dependent variable: LMGap
(1) State-owned (2) Non-state-owned (3) State-owned (4) Non-state-owned
PR 0.482*** 0.256** 0.392*** 0.150**
(3.26) (2.00) (5.64) (2.10)
NPR 0.247** 0.497*** 0.053 0.097
(2.13) (3.69) (1.05) (1.35)
CEOD 0.077 0.034 0.017 0.044*
(1.29) (0.81) (0.61) (1.86)
Bsize 0.068 0.426*** 0.070 0.184***
(0.67) (3.73) (1.60) (3.13)
IndepR 0.325 0.947** 0.412** 0.690***
(0.97) (2.19) (2.58) (2.79)
Commit 0.070* 0.066 0.065*** 0.040*
(1.73) (1.51) (3.69) (1.70)
ROA 1.440*** 1.620*** 0.356*** 0.116
(6.05) (7.25) (3.37) (0.95)
Size 0.110*** 0.220*** 0.023** 0.013
(5.03) (8.10) (2.35) (0.94)
Lev 0.099 0.649*** 0.086 0.225*
(0.53) (2.75) (0.99) (1.73)
Risk 0.217 0.301 0.011 0.026
(0.82) (1.08) (0.09) (0.18)
Q 0.013 0.027** 0.004 0.010*
(1.28) (2.53) (0.79) (1.68)
Exch 0.149 0.259 0.039 0.209*
(1.47) (1.13) (0.81) (1.67)
ST 0.076 0.042 0.035 0.030
(1.31) (0.71) (1.37) (0.91)
Intercept 0.787 3.809*** 0.939*** 0.003
(1.55) (6.28) (4.28) (0.01)
Industry Control Control Control Control
Year Control Control Control Control
N 5301 3885 5301 3885
Adj. R-sq 0.127 0.206 0.058 0.044
N_clust 1011 1120 1011 1120
F 8.602 12.349 4.734 3.097
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain robust standard errors.
Adjusted t-Statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% (two-tailed test).
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% (two-tailed test).
Table 8
Regression results for the eﬀects on pay gap of directors appointed by controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders.
Dependent variable: LEGap Dependent variable: LMGap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PR 0.403*** 0.282***
(4.01) (5.51)
NPR 0.532*** 0.165***
(6.10) (4.07)
CPR 0.392*** 0.233***
(3.41) (3.98)
NCPR 0.309 0.464***
(1.62) (4.78)
CNPR 0.774*** 0.194***
(7.57) (4.06)
NCNPR 0.113 0.113*
(0.91) (1.90)
CEOD 0.089** 0.079** 0.052*** 0.050***
(2.47) (2.22) (2.82) (2.74)
Bsize 0.161** 0.133 0.093** 0.084**
(1.98) (1.64) (2.51) (2.26)
IndepR 0.018 0.040 0.432*** 0.429***
(0.06) (0.14) (2.97) (2.96)
Commit 0.064** 0.063** 0.052*** 0.051***
(2.03) (2.00) (3.59) (3.53)
ROA 1.704*** 1.721*** 0.334*** 0.341***
(9.88) (10.00) (4.07) (4.15)
Size 0.117*** 0.127*** 0.022*** 0.020**
(6.60) (7.09) (2.67) (2.36)
Lev 0.184 0.188 0.110 0.112
(1.19) (1.22) (1.51) (1.53)
Risk 0.267 0.276 0.038 0.043
(1.34) (1.38) (0.40) (0.45)
Q 0.018** 0.019** 0.007* 0.007*
(2.30) (2.44) (1.79) (1.84)
Exch 0.052 0.052 0.021 0.016
(0.50) (0.51) (0.44) (0.33)
ST 0.070 0.064 0.033 0.032
(1.59) (1.47) (1.57) (1.55)
Intercept 1.025** 1.163*** 0.952*** 0.927***
(2.53) (2.87) (5.04) (4.88)
Industry Control Control Control Control
Year Control Control Control Control
N 9186 9186 9186 9186
Adj. R-sq 0.145 0.151 0.063 0.065
N_clust 1985 1985 1985 1985
F 18.289 17.698 9.251 9.051
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain robust standard errors.
Adjusted t-Statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% (two-tailed test).
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% (two-tailed test).
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regression coeﬃcients are 0.247 and 0.497, respectively, signiﬁcant at the 5% level (t = 2.13) and the
1% level (t = 3.69). When the dependent variable is LMGap, PR’s regression coeﬃcients are 0.392 and
0.150, signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t = 5.64) and the 5% level (t = 2.10) for the group of state-owned enterprises
and the group of non-state-owned enterprises, respectively. NPR’s regression coeﬃcients are 0.053 and
0.097 respectively, but are insigniﬁcant (t = 1.05, t = 1.35). The regression results indicate that salaried
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shareholders decrease the pay gap, and that there is no diﬀerence in these relationships between state-owned
enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. In other words, the relationship between the pay gap and the
presence of directors appointed by block shareholders is not aﬀected by state ownership.5.4.3. The eﬀects of directors appointed by controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders
To assess the diﬀerent motivations of directors appointed by controlling shareholders and non-controlling
shareholders, we examine separately the eﬀects on the pay gap of directors appointed by controlling share-
holders and those appointed by non-controlling shareholders. We manually obtain the data for the two vari-
ables (directors appointed by controlling shareholders and directors appointed by non-controlling
shareholders) by extracting details of the directors appointed by all types of shareholders from the CSMARTable 9
Regression results for the eﬀects of directors appointed by shareholders on pay gap when the individual with the highest compensation has
diﬀerent administrative positions.
Dependent variable: LEGap Dependent variable: LMGap
Chairman of the board General manager Others Chairman of the board General manager Others
PR 0.265** 0.438*** 0.535** 0.170*** 0.390*** 0.305**
(2.11) (3.37) (2.12) (2.85) (5.66) (2.32)
NPR 0.459*** 0.395*** 0.711*** 0.159*** 0.170*** 0.201*
(3.70) (3.62) (3.40) (2.70) (3.38) (1.77)
CEOD 0.054 0.150*** 0.083 0.064*** 0.041* 0.099**
(1.30) (3.59) (1.01) (2.94) (1.88) (2.17)
Bsize 0.233** 0.080 0.456** 0.094** 0.076* 0.084
(2.15) (0.85) (2.27) (2.00) (1.77) (0.80)
IndepR 0.437 0.315 0.073 0.365* 0.445*** 0.141
(1.09) (0.96) (0.11) (1.76) (2.76) (0.41)
Commit 0.071* 0.066* 0.061 0.060*** 0.048*** 0.083*
(1.75) (1.68) (0.71) (3.09) (2.65) (1.92)
ROA 1.723*** 1.771*** 1.119*** 0.394*** 0.317*** 0.130
(7.09) (8.29) (2.86) (3.34) (3.33) (0.62)
Size 0.170*** 0.108*** 0.016 0.019* 0.024** 0.007
(7.15) (5.13) (0.42) (1.72) (2.36) (0.33)
Lev 0.007 0.284 0.437 0.111 0.140 0.058
(0.03) (1.50) (1.25) (1.01) (1.52) (0.33)
Risk 0.124 0.288 0.424 0.080 0.155 0.486*
(0.47) (1.07) (0.76) (0.62) (1.26) (1.67)
Q 0.029*** 0.011 0.028 0.009 0.006 0.008
(2.65) (1.14) (1.37) (1.62) (1.15) (0.86)
Exch 0.099 0.050 0.364** 0.040 0.024 0.104
(0.61) (0.47) (2.24) (0.47) (0.49) (1.20)
ST 0.026 0.053 0.185* 0.058* 0.038 0.006
(0.44) (0.99) (1.83) (1.90) (1.52) (0.11)
Intercept 2.422*** 0.586 0.348 0.893*** 1.087*** 0.735
(4.47) (1.21) (0.39) (3.54) (4.70) (1.45)
Industry Control Control Control Control Control Control
Year Control Control Control Control Control Control
N 4833 5307 832 4833 5307 832
Adj. R-sq 0.150 0.151 0.132 0.055 0.080 0.072
N_clust 1439 1600 490 1439 1600 490
F 10.790 13.563 3.290 5.277 7.532 1.869
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain robust standard errors.
Adjusted t-Statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% (two-tailed test).
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% (two-tailed test).
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ers from those appointed by non-controlling shareholders. To examine further eﬀects of this variable, if any,
on the pay gap, we divide the ratio of salaried directors appointed by shareholders (PR) into the ratio of sal-
aried directors appointed by controlling shareholders (CPR) and the ratio of salaried directors appointed by
non-controlling shareholders (NCPR), and divide the ratio of non-salaried directors appointed by sharehold-
ers (NPR) into the ratio of non-salaried directors appointed by controlling shareholders (CNPR) and the ratio
of non-salaried directors appointed by non-controlling shareholders (NCNPR).
In Table 8, we report the corresponding regression results. When the dependent variable is LEGap, the
regression coeﬃcients of PR and NPR, as shown in column (1), are 0.403 and 0.532, respectively, both sig-
niﬁcant at the 1% level (t = 4.01, t = 6.10). The regression coeﬃcient of CPR, as shown in column (2), is
0.392, signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t = 3. 41), whereas the regression coeﬃcient of NCPR is 0.309, which is insig-
niﬁcant (t = 1.62). The regression coeﬃcient of CNPR is 0.774, signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t = 7.57),
whereas the regression coeﬃcient of NCNPR is 0.113, which is insigniﬁcant (t = 0.91). When the depen-
dent variable is LMGap, the regression coeﬃcients of PR and NPR, as shown in column (3), are 0.282 and
0.165, respectively, both signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t = 5.51, t = 4. 07). The regression coeﬃcients of
CPR and NCPR, as shown in column (4), are both signiﬁcantly positive, whereas the regression coeﬃcients
of CNPR and NCNPR are both signiﬁcantly negative. Taken together, these results indicate that the gover-
nance of directors appointed by controlling shareholders does not diﬀer from that of directors appointed by
non-controlling shareholders with regard to pay gaps resulting from agency problems.
5.4.4. The inﬂuence of administrative posts
To assess the potential inﬂuence of the administrative post of the company executives who receive the high-
est compensation, we ﬁrst divide the company personnel with the highest compensation into chairmen of the
board (including Vice Chairmen), general managers (including Vice Presidents) and other executive positions.
Next, we use these subsamples to examine the governance eﬀect of directors appointed by block shareholders
on the pay gap. In Table 9, we report the corresponding regression results. The results for the three subsamples
show that salaried directors appointed by shareholders signiﬁcantly increase the pay gap, whereas non-salaried
directors appointed by shareholders signiﬁcantly decrease the pay gap. The results obtained from carrying out
separate regressions on the three categories—chairmen of the board, general managers and other executive
positions—indicates that the administrative post has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the results reported in this paper.
6. Conclusion and discussion
Originally, the pay gap phenomenon could generally be explained by tournament theory. That is, an appro-
priate pay gap can increase employee motivation and productivity. However, in recent years, company pay
gaps have continued to widen, which now seems to be due to the misuse of power by company executives
to inﬂuence the formulation of compensation. Therefore, based on the executive-power theory, this paper
examines the eﬀects of companies’ governance mechanisms on their pay gap. According to the executive-
power theory, CEOs are particularly likely to use their power to inﬂuence the design of compensation pack-
ages in order to increase their own compensation beyond the optimal pay level, thereby producing an excessive
pay gap. Such a pay gap has a series of negative economic consequences, such as the failure of salary–related
incentive mechanisms and a decline in company performance. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how com-
panies’ governance mechanisms ease the agency problem during the formulation of salary structure and
thereby reduce excessive pay gaps.
Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies during the 2005–2011 period, we ﬁrst examine the
eﬀects on pay gap of the presence of directors appointed by shareholders. The results show that on average,
directors appointed by shareholders have a negative eﬀect on the pay gap. Next, we distinguish between share-
holder-appointed directors according to whether they are salaried by the company or an external source. The
results show that the presence of salaried directors appointed by shareholders signiﬁcantly increases the pay
gap, while the presence of non-salaried directors appointed by shareholders signiﬁcantly decreases the pay
gap. Therefore, it may be diﬃcult for salaried directors appointed by the shareholders of listed companies
to eﬀectively supervise the company’s executives, due to a lack of independence. In contrast, non-salaried
S. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 81–100 99directors appointed by block shareholders are better able to represent shareholders’ interests in carrying out
eﬀective supervision of executives. In this paper, we also use the instrumental-variable regression method to
eliminate the potential adverse eﬀect of endogeneity and conduct some further tests to reduce the potential
eﬀect of correlated factors on the results of the paper. Our conclusions cast light on the pay-gap phenomenon
exhibited by China’s listed companies and oﬀer insights into the decision-making behavior of salaried and
non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders to supervise executives.
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